This guidance document was issued upon approval by vote of the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.
OLC Control Number EEOC-CVG-2003-1 Concise Display Name Enforcement Guidance on Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship under the ADA Issue Date General Topics DisabilityThis document addresses the rights and responsibilities of employers and individuals with disabilities regarding reasonable accommodation and undue hardship under Title I of the ADA.
ADA, Rehabilitation Act, 29 CFR Part 1630, 29 CFR Part 1614 Document Applicant Employers, Employees, Applicants, Attorneys and Practitioners, EEOC Staff Previous Revision Yes. This document replaced a 1999 guidance document by the same name. DisclaimerThe contents of this document do not have the force and effect of law and are not meant to bind the public in any way. This document is intended only to provide clarity to the public regarding existing requirements under the law or agency policies.
This document was issued prior to enactment of the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA), which took effect on January 1, 2009. The ADAAA broadened the statutory definition of disability, as summarized in this list of specific changes.
NOTICE | Number 915.002 |
EEOC | |
October 17, 2002 |
This Enforcement Guidance clarifies the rights and responsibilities of employers and individuals with disabilities regarding reasonable accommodation and undue hardship. Title I of the ADA requires an employer to provide reasonable accommodation to qualified individuals with disabilities who are employees or applicants for employment, except when such accommodation would cause an undue hardship. This Guidance sets forth an employer's legal obligations regarding reasonable accommodation; however, employers may provide more than the law requires.
This Guidance examines what "reasonable accommodation" means and who is entitled to receive it. The Guidance addresses what constitutes a request for reasonable accommodation, the form and substance of the request, and an employer's ability to ask questions and seek documentation after a request has been made.
The Guidance discusses reasonable accommodations applicable to the hiring process and to the benefits and privileges of employment. The Guidance also covers different types of reasonable accommodations related to job performance, including job restructuring, leave, modified or part-time schedules, modified workplace policies, and reassignment. Questions concerning the relationship between the ADA and the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) are examined as they affect leave and modified schedules. Reassignment issues addressed include who is entitled to reassignment and the extent to which an employer must search for a vacant position. The Guidance also examines issues concerning the interplay between reasonable accommodations and conduct rules.
The final section of this Guidance discusses undue hardship, including when requests for schedule modifications and leave may be denied.
Reasonable Accommodation
Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (the "ADA") (1) requires an employer (2) to provide reasonable accommodation to qualified individuals with disabilities who are employees or applicants for employment, unless to do so would cause undue hardship. "In general, an accommodation is any change in the work environment or in the way things are customarily done that enables an individual with a disability to enjoy equal employment opportunities." (3) There are three categories of "reasonable accommodations":
"(i) modifications or adjustments to a job application process that enable a qualified applicant with a disability to be considered for the position such qualified applicant desires; or
(ii) modifications or adjustments to the work environment, or to the manner or circumstances under which the position held or desired is customarily performed, that enable a qualified individual with a disability to perform the essential functions of that position; or
(iii) modifications or adjustments that enable a covered entity's employee with a disability to enjoy equal benefits and privileges of employment as are enjoyed by its other similarly situated employees without disabilities." (4)
The duty to provide reasonable accommodation is a fundamental statutory requirement because of the nature of discrimination faced by individuals with disabilities. Although many individuals with disabilities can apply for and perform jobs without any reasonable accommodations, there are workplace barriers that keep others from performing jobs which they could do with some form of accommodation. These barriers may be physical obstacles (such as inaccessible facilities or equipment), or they may be procedures or rules (such as rules concerning when work is performed, when breaks are taken, or how essential or marginal functions are performed). Reasonable accommodation removes workplace barriers for individuals with disabilities.
Reasonable accommodation is available to qualified applicants and employees with disabilities. (5) Reasonable accommodations must be provided to qualified employees regardless of whether they work part- time or full-time, or are considered "probationary." Generally, the individual with a disability must inform the employer that an accommodation is needed. (6)
There are a number of possible reasonable accommodations that an employer may have to provide in connection with modifications to the work environment or adjustments in how and when a job is performed. These include:
A modification or adjustment is "reasonable" if it "seems reasonable on its face, i.e., ordinarily or in the run of cases;" (8) this means it is "reasonable" if it appears to be "feasible" or "plausible." (9) An accommodation also must be effective in meeting the needs of the individual. (10) In the context of job performance, this means that a reasonable accommodation enables the individual to perform the essential functions of the position. Similarly, a reasonable accommodation enables an applicant with a disability to have an equal opportunity to participate in the application process and to be considered for a job. Finally, a reasonable accommodation allows an employee with a disability an equal opportunity to enjoy the benefits and privileges of employment that employees without disabilities enjoy.
Example A: An employee with a hearing disability must be able to contact the public by telephone. The employee proposes that he use a TTY (11) to call a relay service operator who can then place the telephone call and relay the conversation between the parties. This is "reasonable" because a TTY is a common device used to facilitate communication between hearing and hearing-impaired individuals. Moreover, it would be effective in enabling the employee to perform his job.
Example B: A cashier easily becomes fatigued because of lupus and, as a result, has difficulty making it through her shift. The employee requests a stool because sitting greatly reduces the fatigue. This accommodation is reasonable because it is a common-sense solution to remove a workplace barrier being required to stand when the job can be effectively performed sitting down. This "reasonable" accommodation is effective because it addresses the employee's fatigue and enables her to perform her job.
Example C: A cleaning company rotates its staff to different floors on a monthly basis. One crew member has a psychiatric disability. While his mental illness does not affect his ability to perform the various cleaning functions, it does make it difficult to adjust to alterations in his daily routine. The employee has had significant difficulty adjusting to the monthly changes in floor assignments. He asks for a reasonable accommodation and proposes three options: staying on one floor permanently, staying on one floor for two months and then rotating, or allowing a transition period to adjust to a change in floor assignments. These accommodations are reasonable because they appear to be feasible solutions to this employee's problems dealing with changes to his routine. They also appear to be effective because they would enable him to perform his cleaning duties.
There are several modifications or adjustments that are not considered forms of reasonable accommodation. (12) An employer does not have to eliminate an essential function, i.e., a fundamental duty of the position. This is because a person with a disability who is unable to perform the essential functions, with or without reasonable accommodation, (13) is not a "qualified" individual with a disability within the meaning of the ADA. Nor is an employer required to lower production standards -- whether qualitative or quantitative (14) -- that are applied uniformly to employees with and without disabilities. However, an employer may have to provide reasonable accommodation to enable an employee with a disability to meet the production standard. While an employer is not required to eliminate an essential function or lower a production standard, it may do so if it wishes.
An employer does not have to provide as reasonable accommodations personal use items needed in accomplishing daily activities both on and off the job. Thus, an employer is not required to provide an employee with a prosthetic limb, a wheelchair, eyeglasses, hearing aids, or similar devices if they are also needed off the job. Furthermore, an employer is not required to provide personal use amenities, such as a hot pot or refrigerator, if those items are not provided to employees without disabilities. However, items that might otherwise be considered personal may be required as reasonable accommodations where they are specifically designed or required to meet job-related rather than personal needs. (15)
Undue Hardship
The only statutory limitation on an employer's obligation to provide "reasonable accommodation" is that no such change or modification is required if it would cause "undue hardship" to the employer. (16) "Undue hardship" means significant difficulty or expense and focuses on the resources and circumstances of the particular employer in relationship to the cost or difficulty of providing a specific accommodation. Undue hardship refers not only to financial difficulty, but to reasonable accommodations that are unduly extensive, substantial, or disruptive, or those that would fundamentally alter the nature or operation of the business. (17) An employer must assess on a case-by-case basis whether a particular reasonable accommodation would cause undue hardship. The ADA's "undue hardship" standard is different from that applied by courts under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for religious accommodation. (18)
The ADA requires employers to provide reasonable accommodations so that employees with disabilities can enjoy the "benefits and privileges of employment" equal to those enjoyed by similarly-situated employees without disabilities. Benefits and privileges of employment include, but are not limited to, employer-sponsored: (1) training, (2) services (e.g., employee assistance programs (EAP's), credit unions, cafeterias, lounges, gymnasiums, auditoriums, transportation), and (3) parties or other social functions (e.g., parties to celebrate retirements and birthdays, and company outings). (44) If an employee with a disability needs a reasonable accommodation in order to gain access to, and have an equal opportunity to participate in, these benefits and privileges, then the employer must provide the accommodation unless it can show undue hardship.
Below are discussed certain types of reasonable accommodations related to job performance.
Job restructuring includes modifications such as:
An employer never has to reallocate essential functions as a reasonable accommodation, but can do so if it wishes.
Permitting the use of accrued paid leave, or unpaid leave, is a form of reasonable accommodation when necessitated by an employee's disability. (48) An employer does not have to provide paid leave beyond that which is provided to similarly-situated employees. Employers should allow an employee with a disability to exhaust accrued paid leave first and then provide unpaid leave. (49) For example, if employees get 10 days of paid leave, and an employee with a disability needs 15 days of leave, the employer should allow the individual to use 10 days of paid leave and 5 days of unpaid leave.
An employee with a disability may need leave for a number of reasons related to the disability, including, but not limited to:
The ADA specifically lists "reassignment to a vacant position" as a form of reasonable accommodation. (76) This type of reasonable accommodation must be provided to an employee who, because of a disability, can no longer perform the essential functions of his/her current position, with or without reasonable accommodation, unless the employer can show that it would be an undue hardship. (77)
An employee must be "qualified" for the new position. An employee is "qualified" for a position if s/he: (1) satisfies the requisite skill, experience, education, and other job-related requirements of the position, and (2) can perform the essential functions of the new position, with or without reasonable accommodation. (78) The employee does not need to be the best qualified individual for the position in order to obtain it as a reassignment.
There is no obligation for the employer to assist the individual to become qualified. Thus, the employer does not have to provide training so that the employee acquires necessary skills to take a job. (79) The employer, however, would have to provide an employee with a disability who is being reassigned with any training that is normally provided to anyone hired for or transferred to the position.
Example A: An employer is considering reassigning an employee with a disability to a position which requires the ability to speak Spanish in order to perform an essential function. The employee never learned Spanish and wants the employer to send him to a course to learn Spanish. The employer is not required to provide this training as part of the obligation to make a reassignment. Therefore, the employee is not qualified for this position.
Example B: An employer is considering reassigning an employee with a disability to a position in which she will contract for goods and services. The employee is qualified for the position. The employer has its own specialized rules regarding contracting that necessitate training all individuals hired for these positions. In this situation, the employer must provide the employee with this specialized training.
Before considering reassignment as a reasonable accommodation, employers should first consider those accommodations that would enable an employee to remain in his/her current position. Reassignment is the reasonable accommodation of last resort and is required only after it has been determined that: (1) there are no effective accommodations that will enable the employee to perform the essential functions of his/her current position, or (2) all other reasonable accommodations would impose an undue hardship. (80) However, if both the employer and the employee voluntarily agree that transfer is preferable to remaining in the current position with some form of reasonable accommodation, then the employer may transfer the employee.
"Vacant" means that the position is available when the employee asks for reasonable accommodation, or that the employer knows that it will become available within a reasonable amount of time. A "reasonable amount of time" should be determined on a case-by-case basis considering relevant facts, such as whether the employer, based on experience, can anticipate that an appropriate position will become vacant within a short period of time. (81) A position is considered vacant even if an employer has posted a notice or announcement seeking applications for that position. The employer does not have to bump an employee from a job in order to create a vacancy; nor does it have to create a new position. (82)
Example C: An employer is seeking a reassignment for an employee with a disability. There are no vacant positions today, but the employer has just learned that another employee resigned and that that position will become vacant in four weeks. The impending vacancy is equivalent to the position currently held by the employee with a disability. If the employee is qualified for that position, the employer must offer it to him.
Example D: An employer is seeking a reassignment for an employee with a disability. There are no vacant positions today, but the employer has just learned that an employee in an equivalent position plans to retire in six months. Although the employer knows that the employee with a disability is qualified for this position, the employer does not have to offer this position to her because six months is beyond a "reasonable amount of time." (If, six months from now, the employer decides to advertise the position, it must allow the individual to apply for that position and give the application the consideration it deserves.)
The employer must reassign the individual to a vacant position that is equivalent in terms of pay, status, or other relevant factors (e.g., benefits, geographical location) if the employee is qualified for the position. If there is no vacant equivalent position, the employer must reassign the employee to a vacant lower level position for which the individual is qualified. Assuming there is more than one vacancy for which the employee is qualified, the employer must place the individual in the position that comes closest to the employee's current position in terms of pay, status, etc. (83) If it is unclear which position comes closest, the employer should consult with the employee about his/her preference before determining the position to which the employee will be reassigned. Reassignment does not include giving an employee a promotion. Thus, an employee must compete for any vacant position that would constitute a promotion.
An employer does not have to provide a reasonable accommodation that would cause an "undue hardship" to the employer. Generalized conclusions will not suffice to support a claim of undue hardship. Instead, undue hardship must be based on an individualized assessment of current circumstances that show that a specific reasonable accommodation would cause significant difficulty or expense. (113) A determination of undue hardship should be based on several factors, including:
The ADA's legislative history indicates that Congress wanted employers to consider all possible sources of outside funding when assessing whether a particular accommodation would be too costly. (115) Undue hardship is determined based on the net cost to the employer. Thus, an employer should determine whether funding is available from an outside source, such as a state rehabilitation agency, to pay for all or part of the accommodation. (116) In addition, the employer should determine whether it is eligible for certain tax credits or deductions to offset the cost of the accommodation. Also, to the extent that a portion of the cost of an accommodation causes undue hardship, the employer should ask the individual with a disability if s/he will pay the difference.
If an employer determines that one particular reasonable accommodation will cause undue hardship, but a second type of reasonable accommodation will be effective and will not cause an undue hardship, then the employer must provide the second accommodation.
An employer cannot claim undue hardship based on employees' (or customers') fears or prejudices toward the individual's disability. (117) Nor can undue hardship be based on the fact that provision of a reasonable accommodation might have a negative impact on the morale of other employees. Employers, however, may be able to show undue hardship where provision of a reasonable accommodation would be unduly disruptive to other employees's ability to work.
Example A: An employee with breast cancer is undergoing chemotherapy. As a consequence of the treatment, the employee is subject to fatigue and finds it difficult to keep up with her regular workload. So that she may focus her reduced energy on performing her essential functions, the employer transfers three of her marginal functions to another employee for the duration of the chemotherapy treatments. The second employee is unhappy at being given extra assignments, but the employer determines that the employee can absorb the new assignments with little effect on his ability to perform his own assignments in a timely manner. Since the employer cannot show significant disruption to its operation, there is no undue hardship. (118)
Example B: A convenience store clerk with multiple sclerosis requests that he be allowed to go from working full-time to part- time as a reasonable accommodation because of his disability. The store assigns two clerks per shift, and if the first clerk's hours are reduced, the second clerk's workload will increase significantly beyond his ability to handle his responsibilities. The store determines that such an arrangement will result in inadequate coverage to serve customers in a timely manner, keep the shelves stocked, and maintain store security. Thus, the employer can show undue hardship based on the significant disruption to its operations and, therefore, can refuse to reduce the employee's hours. The employer, however, should explore whether any other reasonable accommodation will assist the store clerk without causing undue hardship.
In US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S., 122 S. Ct. 1516 (2002), the Supreme Court laid out the burdens of proof for an individual with a disability (plaintiff) and an employer (defendant) in an ADA lawsuit alleging failure to provide reasonable accommodation. The "plaintiff/employee (to defeat a defendant/employer's motion for summary judgment) need only show that an 'accommodation' seems reasonable on its face, i.e., ordinarily or in the run of cases." (125) Once the plaintiff has shown that the accommodation s/he needs is "reasonable," the burden shifts to the defendant/employer to provide case-specific evidence proving that reasonable accommodation would cause an undue hardship in the particular circumstances. (126)
The Supreme Court's burden-shifting framework does not affect the interactive process triggered by an individual's request for accommodation. (127) An employer should still engage in this informal dialogue to obtain relevant information needed to make an informed decision.
When assessing whether a Respondent has violated the ADA by denying a reasonable accommodation to a Charging Party, investigators should consider the following:
U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
1-800-669-3362 (Voice)
1-800-800-3302 (TT)
The EEOC's Publication Center has many free documents on the Title I employment provisions of the ADA, including both the statute, 42 U.S.C. . 12101 et seq. (1994), and the regulations, 29 C.F.R. . 1630 (1997). In addition, the EEOC has published a great deal of basic information about reasonable accommodation and undue hardship. The two main sources of interpretive information are: (1) the Interpretive Guidance accompanying the Title I regulations (also known as the "Appendix" to the regulations), 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. .. 1630.2(o), (p), 1630.9 (1997) , and (2) A Technical Assistance Manual on the Employment Provisions (Title I) of the Americans with Disabilities Act III, 8 FEP Manual (BNA) 405:6981, 6998-7018 (1992). The Manual includes a 200-page Resource Directory, including federal and state agencies, and disability organizations that can provide assistance in identifying and locating reasonable accommodations.
The EEOC also has discussed issues involving reasonable accommodation in the following guidances and documents: (1) Enforcement Guidance: Preemployment Disability-Related Questions and Medical Examinations at 5, 6-8, 20, 21-22, 8 FEP Manual (BNA) 405:7191, 7192-94, 7201 (1995); (2) Enforcement Guidance: Workers' Compensation and the ADA at 15-20, 8 FEP Manual (BNA) 405:7391, 7398-7401 (1996); (3) Enforcement Guidance: The Americans with Disabilities Act and Psychiatric Disabilities at 19-28, 8 FEP Manual (BNA) 405:7461, 7470-76 (1997); and (4) Fact Sheet on the Family and Medical Leave Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 at 6-9, 8 FEP Manual (BNA) 405:7371, 7374-76 (1996).
Finally, the EEOC has a poster that employers and labor unions may use to fulfill the ADA's posting requirement.
All of the above-listed documents, with the exception of the ADA Technical Assistance Manual and Resource Directory and the poster, are also available through the Internet at https://www.eeoc.gov.
U.S. Department of Labor
(To obtain information on the Family and Medical Leave Act)
To request written materials:
1-800-959-3652 (Voice)
1-800-326-2577 (TT)
To ask questions: (202) 219-8412 (Voice)
Internal Revenue Service
(For information on tax credits and deductions for providing certain reasonable accommodations)
(202) 622-6060 (Voice)
Job Accommodation Network (JAN)
1-800-232-9675 (Voice/TT)
http://janweb.icdi.wvu.edu/.
A service of the President's Committee on Employment of People with Disabilities. JAN can provide information, free-of-charge, about many types of reasonable accommodations.
ADA Disability and Business Technical Assistance Centers (DBTACs) 1-800-949-4232 (Voice/TT)
The DBTACs consist of 10 federally funded regional centers that provide information, training, and technical assistance on the ADA. Each center works with local business, disability, governmental, rehabilitation, and other professional networks to provide current ADA information and assistance, and places special emphasis on meeting the needs of small businesses. The DBTACs can make referrals to local sources of expertise in reasonable accommodations.
Registry of Interpreters for the Deaf
(301) 608-0050 (Voice/TT)
The Registry offers information on locating and using interpreters and transliteration services.
RESNA Technical Assistance Project
(703) 524-6686 (Voice)
(703) 524-6639 (TT)
http://www.resna.org/hometa1.htm
RESNA, the Rehabilitation Engineering and Assistive Technology Society of North America, can refer individuals to projects in all 50 states and the six territories offering technical assistance on technology-related services for individuals with disabilities. Services may include:
The index applies to the print version. Since page numbering does not exist in HTML files, page numbers have been removed.
Applicants and reasonable accommodation
Attendance and reasonable accommodation
Benefits and privileges of employment and reasonable accommodation
Access to information
Employer-sponsored social functions
Burdens of proof
Choosing between two or more reasonable accommodations
Confidentiality and reasonable accommodation
Disparate treatment (versus reasonable accommodation)
Employees (part-time, full-time, probationary)
Essential functions and reasonable accommodation
Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA); Relationship with the ADA
Firm choice and reasonable accommodation (See also "Last chance agreements")
Interactive process between employer and individual with a disability to determine reasonable accommodation
Landlord/Tenant and reasonable accommodation
Last chance agreements and reasonable accommodation (See also "Firm choice")
Marginal functions and reasonable accommodation
Medical treatment and reasonable accommodation
Employer monitoring of medical treatment
Failure to obtain medical treatment
Side effects of medical treatment and need for reasonable accommodation
Medication and reasonable accommodation
Employer monitoring of medication
Failure to use medication
Side effects of medication and need for reasonable accommodation
Personal use items and reasonable accommodation
Production standards and reasonable accommodation
Public accommodation and employer; who provides reasonable accommodation
"Reasonable accommodation" (definition of)
Reasonable accommodation (effectiveness of)
Reasonable accommodation (how many must employer provide)
Reasonable accommodation (types of)
Access to equipment and computer technology
Changing tests and training materials
Alternatives to leave
Approximate versus fixed date of return
Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA)
Holding open an employee's position
"No-fault" leave policies
Penalizing employees who take leave
Marginal functions (modifying how they are performed; elimination or substitution of)
Modified or part-time schedule
Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA)
Modifying method of performing job function
Modifying workplace policies
Employee must be qualified for vacant position
Interactive process between employer and employee
Relationship between reassignment and general transfer policies
Salary for new position
Seniority systems and reassignment
When must reassignment be offered
Who is entitled to reassignment
Sign language interpreters
Supervisory methods (changing)
Working at home
Reasonable accommodation (who is entitled to receive)
Rehabilitation Act of 1973; Relationship with the ADA
Relationship and association with a person with a disability
Requests for reasonable accommodation
Choosing between two or more reasonable accommodations
Documentation on the need for reasonable accommodation
How to request reasonable accommodation
Interactive process between employer and individual with a disability
Timing of employer's response to a request for reasonable accommodation
When should individual with disability request reasonable accommodation
Who may request reasonable accommodation
Right of individual with a disability to refuse reasonable accommodation
Role of health care providers in reasonable accommodation process
Seniority systems and reassignment
State or local antidiscrimination laws; Relationship with the ADA
Supervisors and reasonable accommodation
Disruption to operations
Factors to assess
Work environment and reasonable accommodation
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12117, 12201-12213 (1994) (codified as amended).
The analysis in this guidance applies to federal sector complaints of non-affirmative action employment discrimination arising under section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 29 U.S.C. § 791(g) (1994). It also applies to complaints of non-affirmative action employment discrimination arising under section 503 and employment discrimination under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. 29 U.S.C. §§ 793(d), 794(d) (1994).
The ADA's requirements regarding reasonable accommodation and undue hardship supercede any state or local disability antidiscrimination laws to the extent that they offer less protection than the ADA. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.1(c)(2) (1997).
2. In addition to employers, the ADA requires employment agencies, labor organizations, and joint labor-management committees to provide reasonable accommodations. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a), (b)(5)(A) (1994).
3. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(o) (1997).
4. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1)(i-iii) (1997) (emphasis added). The notices that employers and labor unions must post informing applicants, employees, and members of labor organizations of their ADA rights must include a description of the reasonable accommodation requirement. These notices, which must be in an accessible format, are available from the EEOC. See the Appendix.
5. All examples used in this document assume that the applicant or employee has an ADA "disability."
Individuals with a relationship or association with a person with a disability are not entitled to receive reasonable accommodations. See Den Hartog v. Wasatch Academy, 129 F.3d 1076, 1084, 7 AD Cas. (BNA) 764, 772 (10th Cir. 1997).
6. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.9 (1997); see also H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 39 (1990) [hereinafter House Judiciary Report]; H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 65 (1990) [hereinafter House Education and Labor Report]; S. Rep. No. 101-116, at 34 (1989)[hereinafter Senate Report].
For more information concerning requests for a reasonable accommodation, see Questions 1-4, infra. For a discussion of the limited circumstance under which an employer would be required to ask an individual with a disability whether s/he needed a reasonable accommodation, see Question 40, infra.
7. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (1994); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(2)(i-ii) (1997).
8. US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S., 122 S. Ct. 1516, 1523 (2002).
Some courts have said that in determining whether an accommodation is "reasonable," one must look at the costs of the accommodation in relation to its benefits. See, e.g., Monette v. Electronic Data Sys. Corp., 90 F.3d 1173, 1184 n.10, 5 AD Cas. (BNA) 1326, 1335 n.10 (6th Cir. 1996); Vande Zande v. Wisconsin Dept. of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 543, 3 AD Cas. (BNA) 1636, 1638-39 (7th Cir. 1995). This "cost/benefit" analysis has no foundation in the statute, regulations, or legislative history of the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9), (10) (1994); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o), (p) (1997); see also Senate Report, supra note 6, at 31-35; House Education and Labor Report, supra note 6, at 57-58.
10. See US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S., 122 S. Ct. 1516, 1522 (2002). The Court explained that "in ordinary English the word 'reasonable' does not mean 'effective.' It is the word 'accommodation,' not the word 'reasonable,' that conveys the need for effectiveness." Id.
11. A TTY is a device that permits individuals with hearing and speech impairments to communicate by telephone.
12. In US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, the Supreme Court held that it was unreasonable, absent "special circumstances," for an employer to provide a reassignment that conflicts with the terms of a seniority system. 535 U.S., 122 S. Ct. 1516, 1524-25 (2002). For a further discussion of this issue, see Question 31, infra.
13. "[W]ith or without reasonable accommodation" includes, if necessary, reassignment to a vacant position. Thus, if an employee is no longer qualified because of a disability to continue in his/her present position, an employer must reassign him/her as a reasonable accommodation. See the section on "Reassignment," infra pp. 37-38 and n.77.
14. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(n) (1997).
15. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.9 (1997).
16. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (b)(5)(A) (1994) (it is a form of discrimination to fail to provide a reasonable accommodation "unless such covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship . . ."); see also 42 U.S.C.
§ 12111(10) (1994) (defining "undue hardship" based on factors assessing cost and difficulty).
The legislative history discusses financial, administrative, and operational limitations on providing reasonable accommodations only in the context of defining "undue hardship." Compare Senate Report, supra note 6, at 31-34 with 35-36; House Education and Labor Report, supra note 6, at 57-58 with 67-70.
17. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10) (1994); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p) (1997); 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(p) (1997).
18. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.15(d) (1997). See also Eckles v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 94 F.3d 1041, 1048-49, 5 AD Cas. (BNA) 1367, 1372-73 (7th Cir. 1996); Bryant v. Better Business Bureau of Maryland, 923 F. Supp. 720, 740, 5 AD Cas. (BNA) 625, 638 (D. Md. 1996).
19. See, e.g., Schmidt v. Safeway Inc., 864 F. Supp. 991, 997, 3 AD Cas. (BNA) 1141, 1146-47 (D. Or. 1994) ("statute does not require the plaintiff to speak any magic words. . . The employee need not mention the ADA or even the term 'accommodation.'"). See also Hendricks-Robinson v. Excel Corp., 154 F.3d 685, 694, 8 AD Cas. (BNA) 875, 882 (7th Cir. 1998) ("[a] request as straightforward as asking for continued employment is a sufficient request for accommodation"); Bultemeyer v. Ft. Wayne Community Schs., 100 F.3d 1281, 1285, 6 AD Cas. (BNA) 67, 71 (7th Cir. 1996) (an employee with a known psychiatric disability requested reasonable accommodation by stating that he could not do a particular job and by submitting a note from his psychiatrist); McGinnis v. Wonder Chemical Co., 5 AD Cas. (BNA) 219 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (employer on notice that accommodation had been requested because: (1) employee told supervisor that his pain prevented him from working and (2) employee had requested leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act).
Nothing in the ADA requires an individual to use legal terms or to anticipate all of the possible information an employer may need in order to provide a reasonable accommodation. The ADA avoids a formulistic approach in favor of an interactive discussion between the employer and the individual with a disability, after the individual has requested a change due to a medical condition. Nevertheless, some courts have required that individuals initially provide detailed information in order to trigger the employer's duty to investigate whether reasonable accommodation is required. See, e.g., Taylor v. Principal Fin. Group, Inc., 93 F.3d 155, 165, 5 AD Cas. (BNA) 1653, 1660 (5th Cir. 1996); Miller v. Nat'l Cas. Co., 61 F.3d 627, 629-30, 4 AD Cas. (BNA) 1089, 1090-91 (8th Cir. 1995).
20. See Questions 5 - 7, infra, for a further discussion on when an employer may request reasonable documentation about a person's "disability" and the need for reasonable accommodation.
21. Cf. Beck v. Univ. of Wis. Bd. of Regents, 75 F.3d 1130, 5 AD Cas. (BNA) 304 (7th Cir. 1996); Schmidt v. Safeway Inc., 864 F. Supp. 991, 997, 3 AD Cas. (BNA) 1141, 1146 (D. Or. 1994). But see Miller v. Nat'l Casualty Co., 61 F.3d 627, 630, 4 AD Cas. (BNA) 1089, 1091 (8th Cir. 1995) (employer had no duty to investigate reasonable accommodation despite the fact that the employee's sister notified the employer that the employee "was mentally falling apart and the family was trying to get her into the hospital").
The employer should be receptive to any relevant information or requests it receives from a third party acting on the individual's behalf because the reasonable accommodation process presumes open communication in order to help the employer make an informed decision. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(o), 1630.9 (1997); 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. §§ 1630.2(o), 1630.9 (1997).
22. Although individuals with disabilities are not required to keep records, they may find it useful to document requests for reasonable accommodation in the event there is a dispute about whether or when they requested accommodation. Employers, however, must keep all employment records, including records of requests for reasonable accommodation, for one year from the making of the record or the personnel action involved, whichever occurs later. If a charge is filed, records must be preserved until the charge is resolved. 29 C.F.R. § 1602.14 (1997).
23. Cf. Masterson v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., Nos. 98-6126, 98-6025, 1998 WL 856143 (10th Cir. Dec. 11, 1998) (fact that an employee with a disability does not need a reasonable accommodation all the time does not relieve employer from providing an accommodation for the period when he does need one).
24. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3) (1997); 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. §§ 1630.2(o), 1630.9 (1997); see also Haschmann v. Time Warner Entertainment Co., 151 F.3d 591, 601, 8 AD Cas. (BNA) 692, 700 (7th Cir. 1998); Dalton v. Subaru-Isuzu, 141 F.3d 667, 677, 7 AD Cas. (BNA) 1872, 1880-81 (7th Cir. 1998). The appendix to the regulations at § 1630.9 provides a detailed discussion of the reasonable accommodation process.
Engaging in an interactive process helps employers to discover and provide reasonable accommodation. Moreover, in situations where an employer fails to provide a reasonable accommodation (and undue hardship would not be a valid defense), evidence that the employer engaged in an interactive process can demonstrate a "good faith" effort which can protect an employer from having to pay punitive and certain compensatory damages. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(3) (1994).
25. The burden-shifting framework outlined by the Supreme Court in US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S., 122 S. Ct. 1516, 1523 (2002), does not affect the interactive process between an employer and an individual seeking reasonable accommodation. See pages 61-62, infra, for a further discussion.
26. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.9 (1997). The Appendix to this Guidance provides a list of resources to identify possible accommodations.
27. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.9 (1997); see also EEOC Enforcement Guidance: Preemployment Disability-Related Questions and Medical Examinations at 6, 8 FEP Manual (BNA) 405:7191, 7193 (1995) [hereinafter Preemployment Questions and Medical Examinations]; EEOC Enforcement Guidance: The Americans with Disabilities Act and Psychiatric Disabilities at 22-23, 8 FEP Manual (BNA) 405:7461, 7472-73 (1997) [hereinafter ADA and Psychiatric Disabilities]. Although the latter Enforcement Guidance focuses on psychiatric disabilities, the legal standard under which an employer may request documentation applies to disabilities generally.
When an employee seeks leave as a reasonable accommodation, an employer's request for documentation about disability and the need for leave may overlap with the certification requirements of the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 C.F.R. §§ 825.305-.306, 825.310-.311 (1997).
28. Since a doctor cannot disclose information about a patient without his/her permission, an employer must obtain a release from the individual that will permit his/her doctor to answer questions. The release should be clear as to what information will be requested. Employers must maintain the confidentiality of all medical information collected during this process, regardless of where the information comes from. See Question 42 and note 111, infra.
29. See Question 9, infra, for information on choosing between two or more effective accommodations.
30. This employee also might be covered under the Family and Medical Leave Act, and if so, the employer would need to comply with the requirements of that statute.
31. See Templeton v. Neodata Servs., Inc., No. 98-1106, 1998 WL 852516 (10th Cir. Dec. 10, 1998); Beck v. Univ. of Wis. Bd. of Regents, 75 F.3d 1130, 1134, 5 AD Cas. (BNA) 304, 307 (7th Cir. 1996); McAlpin v. National Semiconductor Corp., 921 F. Supp. 1518, 1525, 5 AD Cas. (BNA) 1047, 1052 (N.D. Tex. 1996).
32. See Hendricks-Robinson v. Excel Corp., 154 F.3d 685, 700, 8 AD Cas. (BNA) 875, 887 (7th Cir. 1998).
33. If an individual provides sufficient documentation to show the existence of an ADA disability and the need for reasonable accommodation, continued efforts by the employer to require that the individual see the employer's health professional could be considered retaliation.
34. Employers also may consider alternatives like having their health professional consult with the individual's health professional, with the employee's consent.
35. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.9 (1997); see also Stewart v. Happy Herman's Cheshire Bridge, Inc., 117 F.3d 1278, 1285-86, 6 AD Cas. (BNA) 1834, 1839 (11th Cir. 1997); Hankins v. The Gap, Inc., 84 F.3d 797, 800, 5 AD Cas. (BNA) 924, 926-27 (6th Cir. 1996); Gile v. United Airlines, Inc., 95 F.3d 492, 499, 5 AD Cas. (BNA) 1466, 1471 (7th Cir. 1996).
36. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. §1630.9 (1997).
37. See Dalton v. Subaru-Isuzu Automotive, Inc., 141 F.3d 667, 677, 7 AD Cas. (BNA) 1872, 1880 (7th Cir. 1998).
38. In determining whether there has been an unnecessary delay in responding to a request for reasonable accommodation, relevant factors would include: (1) the reason(s) for the delay, (2) the length of the delay, (3) how much the individual with a disability and the employer each contributed to the delay, (4) what the employer was doing during the delay, and (5) whether the required accommodation was simple or complex to provide.
39. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.9 (1997); see also Hankins v. The Gap, Inc., 84 F.3d 797, 801, 5 AD Cas. (BNA) 924, 927 (6th Cir. 1996).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2)(A) (1994); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.13(a) (1997). For a thorough discussion of these requirements, see Preemployment Questions and Medical Examinations, supra note 27, at 6-8, 8 FEP Manual (BNA) 405:7193-94.
41. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3) (1994); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(b) (1997); see also Preemployment Questions and Medical Examinations, supra note 27, at 20, 8 FEP Manual (BNA) 405:7201.
42. See Question 12, supra, for the circumstances under which an employer may ask an applicant whether s/he will need reasonable accommodation to perform specific job functions.
43. The discussions and examples in this section assume that there is only one effective accommodation and that the reasonable accommodation will not cause undue hardship.
44. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.9 (1997).
45. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181(7), 12182(1)(A), (2)(A)(iii) (1994).
46. The discussions and examples in this section assume that there is only one effective accommodation and that the reasonable accommodation will not cause undue hardship.
The types of reasonable accommodations discussed in this section are not exhaustive. For example, employees with disabilities may request reasonable accommodations to modify the work environment, such as changes to the ventilation system or relocation of a work space.
See the Appendix for additional resources to identify other possible reasonable accommodations.
47. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B) (1994); 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. §§ 1630.2(o), 1630.9 (1997); see Benson v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 62 F.3d 1108, 1112-13, 4 AD Cas. (BNA) 1234, 1236-37 (8th Cir. 1995).
48. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(o) (1997). See Cehrs v. Northeast Ohio Alzheimer's, 155 F.3d 775, 782, 8 AD Cas. (BNA) 825, 830-31 (6th Cir. 1998).
An employee who needs leave, or a part-time or modified schedule, as a reasonable accommodation also may be entitled to leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act. See Questions 21 and 23, infra.
49. See A Technical Assistance Manual on the Employment Provisions (Title I) of the Americans with Disabilities Act, at 3.10(4), 8 FEP Manual (BNA) 405:6981, 7011 (1992) [hereinafter TAM].
50. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B) (1994); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(2)(ii) (1997). See US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S., 122 S. Ct. 1516, 1521 (2002). See also Question 24, infra. While undue hardship cannot be based solely on the existence of a no-fault leave policy, the employer may be able to show undue hardship based on an individualized assessment showing the disruption to the employer's operations if additional leave is granted beyond the period allowed by the policy. In determining whether undue hardship exists, the employer should consider how much additional leave is needed (e.g., two weeks, six months, one year?).
51. See Schmidt v. Safeway Inc., 864 F. Supp. 991, 996-97, 3 AD Cas. (BNA) 1141, 1145-46 (D. Or. 1994); Corbett v. National Products Co., 4 AD Cas. (BNA) 987, 990 (E.D. Pa. 1995).
52. See EEOC Enforcement Guidance: Workers' Compensation and the ADA at 16, 8 FEP Manual (BNA) 405:7391, 7399 (1996) [hereinafter Workers' Compensation and the ADA]. See also pp. 37-45, infra, for information on reassignment as a reasonable accommodation.
53. Cf. Kiel v. Select Artificials, 142 F.3d 1077, 1080, 8 AD Cas. (BNA) 43, 44 (8th Cir. 1998).
54. See Criado v. IBM, 145 F.3d 437, 444-45, 8 AD Cas. (BNA) 336, 341 (1st Cir. 1998).
55. But see Matthews v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 128 F.3d 1194, 1197-98, 7 AD Cas. (BNA) 1651, 1653-54 (7th Cir. 1997) (an employee who, because of a heart attack, missed several months of work and returned on a part-time basis until health permitted him to work full-time, could be terminated during a RIF based on his lower productivity). In reaching this decision, the Seventh Circuit failed to consider that the employee needed leave and a modified schedule as reasonable accommodations for his disability, and that the accommodations became meaningless when he was penalized for using them.
56. If an employee, however, qualifies for leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act, an employer may not require him/her to remain on the job with an adjustment in lieu of taking leave. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.702(d)(1) (1997).
57. See Question 9, supra.
58. For more detailed information on issues raised by the interplay between these statutes, refer to the FMLA/ADA Fact Sheet listed in the Appendix.
59. Employers should remember that many employees eligible for FMLA leave will not be entitled to leave as a reasonable accommodation under the ADA, either because they do not meet the ADA's definition of disability or, if they do have an ADA disability, the need for leave is unrelated to that disability.
60. 29 C.F.R. §§ 825.214(a), 825.215 (1997).
61. For further information on the undue hardship factors, see infra pp. 55-56.
62. 29 C.F.R. § 825.702(c)(4) (1997).
63. 42 U.S.C. §12111 (9) (B) (1994); see Ralph v. Lucent Technologies, Inc., 135 F.3d 166, 172, 7 AD Cas. (BNA) 1345, 1349 (1st Cir. 1998) (a modified schedule is a form of reasonable accommodation).
64. See US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S., 122 S. Ct. 1516, 1521 (2002).
65. Certain courts have characterized attendance as an "essential function." See, e.g., Carr v. Reno, 23 F.3d 525, 530, 3 AD Cas. (BNA) 434, 438 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Jackson v. Department of Veterans Admin., 22 F.3d 277, 278-79, 3 AD Cas. (BNA) 483, 484 (11th Cir. 1994). Attendance, however, is not an essential function as defined by the ADA because it is not one of "the fundamental job duties of the employment position." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1) (1997) (emphasis added). As the regulations make clear, essential functions are duties to be performed. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(2) (1997). See Haschmann v. Time Warner Entertainment Co., 151 F.3d 591, 602, 8 AD Cas. (BNA) 692, 701 (7th Cir. 1998); Cehrs v. Northeast Ohio Alzheimer's, 155 F.3d 775, 782-83, 8 AD Cas. (BNA) 825, 830-31 (6th Cir. 1998).
On the other hand, attendance is relevant to job performance and employers need not grant all requests for a modified schedule. To the contrary, if the time during which an essential function is performed is integral to its successful completion, then an employer may deny a request to modify an employee's schedule as an undue hardship.
66. Employers covered under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) should determine whether any denial of leave or a modified schedule is also permissible under that law. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.203 (1997).
67. For more detailed information on issues raised by the interplay between these statutes, refer to the FMLA/ADA Fact Sheet listed in the Appendix.
68. See infra pp. 37-45 for more information on reassignment, including under what circumstances an employer and employee may voluntarily agree that a transfer is preferable to having the employee remain in his/her current position.
69. 29 C.F.R. § 825.204 (1997); see also special rules governing intermittent leave for instructional employees at §§ 825.601, 825.602.
70. 29 C.F.R. §§ 825.209, 825.210 (1997).
71. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B) (1994); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(2)(ii) (1997). See US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S., 122 S. Ct. 1516, 1521 (2002).
72. See Dutton v. Johnson County Bd. of Comm'rs, 868 F. Supp. 1260, 1264-65, 3 AD Cas. (BNA) 1614, 1618 (D. Kan. 1994).
73. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.15(b), (c) (1997). See also Question 17, supra.
74. But cf. Miller v. Nat'l Casualty Co., 61 F.3d 627, 629-30, 4 AD Cas. (BNA) 1089, 1090 (8th Cir. 1995) (court refuses to find that employee's sister had requested reasonable accommodation despite the fact that the sister informed the employer that the employee was having a medical crisis necessitating emergency hospitalization).
75. For information on how reassignment may apply to employers who provide light duty positions, see Workers' Compensation and the ADA, supra note 52, at 20-23, 8 FEP Manual (BNA) 405:7401-03.
76. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B) (1994); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(2)(ii) (1997). See Benson v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 62 F.3d 1108, 1114, 4 AD Cas. (BNA) 1234, 1238 (8th Cir. 1995); Monette v. Electronic Data Sys. Corp., 90 F.3d 1173, 1187, 5 AD Cas. (BNA) 1326, 1338 (6th Cir. 1996); Gile v. United Airlines, Inc., 95 F.3d 492, 498, 5 AD Cas. (BNA) 1466, 1471 (7th Cir. 1996).
Reassignment is available only to employees, not to applicants. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(o) (1997).
77. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(o) (1997); see Haysman v. Food Lion, Inc., 893 F. Supp. 1092, 1104, 4 AD Cas. (BNA) 1297, 1305 (S.D. Ga. 1995).
Some courts have found that an employee who is unable to perform the essential functions of his/her current position is unqualified to receive a reassignment. See, e.g., Schmidt v. Methodist Hosp. of Indiana, Inc., 89 F.3d 342, 345, 5 AD Cas. (BNA) 1340, 1342 (7th Cir. 1996); Pangalos v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 5 AD Cas. (BNA) 1825, 1826 (E.D. Pa. 1996). These decisions, however, nullify Congress' inclusion of reassignment in the ADA. An employee requires a reassignment only if s/he is unable to continue performing the essential functions of his/her current position, with or without reasonable accommodation. Thus, an employer must provide reassignment either when reasonable accommodation in an employee's current job would cause undue hardship or when it would not be possible. See Aka v. Washington Hosp. Ctr.,156 F.3d 1284, 1300-01, 8 AD Cas. (BNA) 1093, 1107-08 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Dalton v. Subaru-Isuzu Automotive, Inc., 141 F.3d 667, 678, 7 AD Cas. (BNA) 1872, 1880 (7th Cir. 1998); see also ADA and Psychiatric Disabilities, supra note 27, at 28, 8 FEP Manual (BNA) 405:7476; Workers' Compensation and the ADA, supra note 52, at 17-18, 8 FEP Manual (BNA) 405:7399-7400.
78. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m) (1997); 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. §§ 1630.2(m), 1630.2(o)(1997). See Stone v. Mount Vernon, 118 F.3d 92, 100-01, 6 AD Cas. (BNA) 1685, 1693 (2d Cir. 1997).
79. See Quintana v. Sound Distribution Corp., 6 AD Cas. (BNA) 842, 846 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
80. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. §1630.2(o) (1997); Senate Report, supra note 6, at 31; House Education and Labor Report, supra note 6, at 63.
81. For suggestions on what the employee can do while waiting for a position to become vacant within a reasonable amount of time, see note 89, infra.
82. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(o) (1997); see also White v. York Int'l Corp., 45 F.3d 357, 362, 3 AD Cas. (BNA) 1746, 1750 (10th Cir. 1995).
83. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(o) (1997).
84. See US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S., 122 S. Ct. 1516, 1521, 1524 (2002); see also Aka v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1304-05, 8 AD Cas. (BNA) 1093, 1110-11 (D.C. Cir. 1998); United States v. Denver, 943 F. Supp. 1304, 1312, 6 AD Cas. (BNA) 245, 252 (D. Colo. 1996). See also Question 24, supra.
85. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B) (1994); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(2)(ii) (1997); see Hendricks-Robinson v. Excel Corp., 154 F.3d 685, 695, 8 AD Cas. (BNA) 875, 883 (7th Cir. 1998); see generally Dalton v. Subaru-Isuzu Automotive, Inc., 141 F.3d 667, 677-78, 7 AD Cas. (BNA) 1872, 1880-81 (7th Cir. 1998).
86. See Gile v. United Airlines, Inc., 95 F.3d 492, 499, 5 AD Cas. (BNA) 1466, 1472 (7th Cir. 1996); see generally United States v. Denver, 943 F. Supp. 1304, 1311-13, 6 AD Cas. (BNA) 245, 251-52 (D. Colo. 1996).
Some courts have limited the obligation to provide a reassignment to positions within the same department or facility in which the employee currently works, except when the employer's standard practice is to provide inter-department or inter-facility transfers for all employees. See, e.g., Emrick v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 875 F. Supp. 393, 398, 4 AD Cas.(BNA) 1, 4-5 (E.D. Tex. 1995). However, the ADA requires modification of workplace policies, such as transfer policies, as a form of reasonable accommodation. See Question 24, supra. Therefore, policies limiting transfers cannot be a per se bar to reassigning someone outside his/her department or facility. \ Furthermore, the ADA requires employers to provide reasonable accommodations, including reassignment, regardless of whether such accommodations are routinely granted to non-disabled employees. See Question 26, supra.
87. See Hendricks-Robinson v. Excel Corp., 154 F.3d 685, 695-96, 697-98, 8 AD Cas. (BNA) 875, 883, 884 (7th Cir. 1998) (employer cannot mislead disabled employees who need reassignment about full range of vacant positions; nor can it post vacant positions for such a short period of time that disabled employees on medical leave have no realistic chance to learn about them); Mengine v. Runyon, 114 F.3d 415, 420, 6 AD Cas. (BNA) 1530, 1534 (3d Cir. 1997) (an employer has a duty to make reasonable efforts to assist an employee in identifying a vacancy because an employee will not have the ability or resources to identify a vacant position absent participation by the employer); Woodman v. Runyon, 132 F.3d 1330, 1344, 7 AD Cas. (BNA) 1189, 1199 (10th Cir. 1997) (federal employers are far better placed than employees to investigate in good faith the availability of vacant positions).
88. See Dalton v. Subaru-Isuzu Automotive, Inc., 141 F.3d 667, 678, 7 AD Cas. (BNA)1872, 1881 (7th Cir. 1998) (employer must first identify full range of alternative positions and then determine which ones employee qualified to perform, with or without reasonable accommodation); Hendricks-Robinson v. Excel Corp., 154 F.3d 685, 700, 8 AD Cas. (BNA) 875, 886-87 (7th Cir. 1998) (employer's methodology to determine if reassignment is appropriate does not constitute the "interactive process" contemplated by the ADA if it is directive rather than interactive); Mengine v. Runyon, 114 F.3d 415, 419-20, 6 AD Cas. (BNA) 1530, 1534 (3d Cir. 1997) (once an employer has identified possible vacancies, an employee has a duty to identify which one he is capable of performing).
89. If it will take several weeks to determine whether an appropriate vacant position exists, the employer and employee should discuss the employee's status during that period. There are different possibilities depending on the circumstances, but they may include: use of accumulated paid leave, use of unpaid leave, or a temporary assignment to a light duty position. Employers also may choose to take actions that go beyond the ADA's requirements, such as eliminating an essential function of the employee's current position, to enable an employee to continue working while a reassignment is sought.
90. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(b) (1994); 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(o) (1997). See Senate Report, supra note 6, at 31 ("If an employee, because of disability, can no longer perform the essential functions of the job that she or he has held, a transfer to another vacant job for which the person is qualified may prevent the employee from being out of work and the employer from losing a valuable worker."). See Wood v. County of Alameda, 5 AD Cas. (BNA) 173, 184 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (when employee could no longer perform job because of disability, she was entitled to reassignment to a vacant position, not simply an opportunity to "compete"); cf. Aka v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1304-05, 8 AD Cas. (BNA) 1093, 1110-11 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (the court, in interpreting a collective bargaining agreement provision authorizing reassignment of disabled employees, states that "[a]n employee who is allowed to compete for jobs precisely like any other applicant has not been "reassigned"); United States v. Denver, 943 F. Supp. 1304, 1310-11, 6 AD Cas. (BNA) 245, 250 (D. Colo. 1996) (the ADA requires employers to move beyond traditional analysis and consider reassignment as a method of enabling a disabled worker to do a job).
Some courts have suggested that reassignment means simply an opportunity to compete for a vacant position. See, e.g., Daugherty v. City of El Paso, 56 F.3d 695, 700, 4 AD Cas. (BNA) 993, 997 (5th Cir. 1995). Such an interpretation nullifies the clear statutory language stating that reassignment is a form of reasonable accommodation. Even without the ADA, an employee with a disability may have the right to compete for a vacant position.
91. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(o) (1997).
92. See US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S., 122 S. Ct. 1516, 1524-25 (2002).
94. Id. at 1525. In a lawsuit, the plaintiff/employee bears the burden of proof to show the existence of "special circumstances" that warrant a jury's finding that a reassignment is "reasonable" despite the presence of a seniority system. If an employee can show "special circumstances," then the burden shifts to the employer to show why the reassignment would pose an undue hardship. See id.
96. Id. The Supreme Court made clear that these two were examples of "special circumstances" and that they did not constitute an exhaustive list of examples. Furthermore, Justice Stevens, in a concurring opinion, raised additional issues that could be relevant to show special circumstances that would make it reasonable for an employer to make an exception to its seniority system. See id. at 1526.
97. The discussions and examples in this section assume that there is only one effective accommodation and that the reasonable accommodation will not cause an undue hardship.
98. See Ralph v. Lucent Technologies, Inc., 135 F.3d 166, 171, 7 AD Cas. (BNA) 1345, 1349 (1st Cir. 1998).
99. For a discussion on ways to modify supervisory methods, see ADA and Psychiatric Disabilities, supra note 27, at 26-27, 8 FEP Manual (BNA) 405:7475.
100. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1)(ii), (2)(ii) (1997) (modifications or adjustments to the manner or circumstances under which the position held or desired is customarily performed that enable a qualified individual with a disability to perform the essential functions).
101. Courts have differed regarding whether "work-at-home" can be a reasonable accommodation. Compare Langon v. Department of Health and Human Servs., 959 F.2d 1053, 1060, 2 AD Cas. (BNA) 152, 159 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Anzalone v. Allstate Insurance Co., 5 AD Cas. (BNA) 455, 458 (E.D. La. 1995); Carr v. Reno, 23 F.3d 525, 530, 3 AD Cas. (BNA) 434, 437-38 (D.D.C. 1994), with Vande Zande v. Wisconsin Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 545, 3 AD Cas. (BNA) 1636, 1640 (7th Cir. 1995). Courts that have rejected working at home as a reasonable accommodation focus on evidence that personal contact, interaction, and coordination are needed for a specific position. See, e.g., Whillock v. Delta Air Lines, 926 F. Supp. 1555, 1564, 5 AD Cas. (BNA) 1027 (N.D. Ga. 1995), aff'd, 86 F.3d 1171, 7 AD Cas. (BNA) 1267 (11th Cir. 1996); Misek-Falkoff v. IBM Corp., 854 F. Supp. 215, 227-28, 3 AD Cas. (BNA) 449, 457-58 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), aff'd, 60 F.3d 811, 6 AD Cas. (BNA) 576 (2d Cir. 1995).
102. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(d) (1997).
103. See Siefken v. Arlington Heights, 65 F.3d 664, 666, 4 AD Cas. (BNA) 1441, 1442 (7th Cir. 1995). Therefore, it may be in the employee's interest to request a reasonable accommodation before performance suffers or conduct problems occur. For more information on conduct standards, including when they are job-related and consistent with business necessity, see ADA and Psychiatric Disabilities, supra note 27, at 29-32, 8 FEP Manual (BNA) 405:7476-78.
An employer does not have to offer a "firm choice" or a "last chance agreement" to an employee who performs poorly or who has engaged in misconduct because of alcoholism. "Firm choice" or "last chance agreements" involve excusing past performance or conduct problems resulting from alcoholism in exchange for an employee's receiving substance abuse treatment and refraining from further use of alcohol. Violation of such an agreement generally warrants termination. Since the ADA does not require employers to excuse poor performance or violation of conduct standards that are job-related and consistent with business necessity, an employer has no obligation to provide "firm choice" or a "last chance agreement" as a reasonable accommodation. See Johnson v. Babbitt, EEOC Docket No. 03940100 (March 28, 1996). However, an employer may choose to offer an employee a "firm choice" or a "last chance agreement."
104. See ADA and Psychiatric Disabilities, supra note 27, at 31-32, 8 FEP Manual (BNA) 405:7477-78.
105. See Robertson v. The Neuromedical Ctr., 161 F.3d 292, 296 (5th Cir. 1998); see also ADA and Psychiatric Disabilities, supra note 27, at 27-28, 8 FEP Manual (BNA) 405:7475.
106. While from an employer's perspective it may appear that an employee is "failing" to use medication or follow a certain treatment, such questions can be complex. There are many reasons why a person would choose to forgo treatment, including expense and serious side effects.
107. See Vande Zande v. Wisconsin Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 544, 3 AD Cas. (BNA) 1636, 1639 (7th Cir. 1995).
108. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.9 (1997); see also House Judiciary Report, supra note 6, at 39; House Education and Labor Report, supra note 6, at 65; Senate Report, supra note 6, at 34.
See, e.g., Taylor v. Principal Fin. Group, Inc., 93 F.3d 155, 165, 5 AD Cas. (BNA) 1653, 1659 (5th Cir. 1996); Tips v. Regents of Texas Tech Univ., 921 F. Supp. 1515, 1518 (N.D. Tex. 1996); Cheatwood v. Roanoke Indus., 891 F. Supp. 1528, 1538, 5 AD Cas. (BNA) 141, 147 (N.D. Ala. 1995); Mears v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., 905 F. Supp. 1075, 1080, 5 AD Cas. (BNA) 1295, 1300 (S.D. Ga. 1995), aff'd, 87 F.3d 1331, 6 AD Cas. (BNA) 1152 (11th Cir. 1996). But see Schmidt v. Safeway Inc., 864 F. Supp. 991, 997, 3 AD Cas. (BNA) 1141, 1146-47 (D. Or. 1994) (employer had obligation to provide reasonable accommodation because it knew of the employee's alcohol problem and had reason to believe that an accommodation would permit the employee to perform the job).
An employer may not assert that it never received a request for reasonable accommodation, as a defense to a claim of failure to provide reasonable accommodation, if it actively discouraged an individual from making such a request.
For more information about an individual requesting reasonable accommodation, see Questions 1-4, supra.
109. See Question 5, supra, for information on the interactive process.
110. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.9 (1997).
111. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3)(B), (d)(4)(C) (1994); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(b)(1) (1997). The limited exceptions to the ADA confidentiality requirements are:
(1) supervisors and managers may be told about necessary restrictions on the work or duties of the employee and about necessary accommodations; (2) first aid and safety personnel may be told if the disability might require emergency treatment; and (3) government officials investigating compliance with the ADA must be given relevant information on request. In addition, the Commission has interpreted the ADA to allow employers to disclose medical information in the following circumstances: (1) in accordance with state workers' compensation laws, employers may disclose information to state workers' compensation offices, state second injury funds, or workers' compensation insurance carriers; and (2) employers are permitted to use medical information for insurance purposes. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. §1630.14(b) (1997); Preemployment Questions and Medical Examinations, supra note 27, at 23, 8 FEP Manual (BNA) 405:7201; Workers' Compensation and the ADA, supra note 52, at 7, 8 FEP Manual (BNA) 405:7394.
112. The discussions and examples in this section assume that there is only one effective accommodation.
113. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. §1630.15(d) (1996); see also Stone v. Mount Vernon, 118 F.3d 92, 101, 6 AD Cas. (BNA) 1685, 1693 (2d Cir. 1997) (an employer who has not hired any persons with disabilities cannot claim undue hardship based on speculation that if it were to hire several people with disabilities it may not have sufficient staff to perform certain tasks); Bryant v. Better Business Bureau of Greater Maryland, 923 F. Supp. 720, 735, 5 AD Cas. (BNA) 625, 634 (D. Md. 1996).
114. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(B) (1994); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p)(2) (1997); 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(p) (1997); TAM, supra note 49, at 3.9, 8 FEP Manual (BNA) 405:7005-07.
115. See Senate Report, supra note 6, at 36; House Education and Labor Report, supra note 6, at 69. See also 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(p) (1997).
116. See the Appendix on how to obtain information about the tax credit and deductions.
117. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.15(d) (1997).
118. Failure to transfer marginal functions because of its negative impact on the morale of other employees also could constitute disparate treatment when similar morale problems do not stop an employer from reassigning tasks in other situations.
119. See Haschmann v. Time Warner Entertainment Co., 151 F.3d 591, 600-02, 8 AD Cas. (BNA) 692, 699-701 (7th Cir. 1998).
120. See Criado v. IBM, 145 F.3d 437, 444-45, 8 AD Cas. (BNA) 336, 341 (1st Cir. 1998).
121. The ADA's definition of undue hardship does not include any consideration of a cost-benefit analysis. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10) (1994); see also House Education and Labor Report, supra note 6, at 69 ("[T]he committee wishes to make clear that the fact that an accommodation is used by only one employee should not be used as a negative factor counting in favor of a finding of undue hardship.").
Furthermore, the House of Representatives rejected a cost-benefit approach by defeating an amendment which would have presumed undue hardship if a reasonable accommodation cost more than 10% of the employee's annual salary. See 136 Cong. Rec. H2475 (1990), see also House Judiciary Report, supra note 6, at 41; 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.15(d) (1997).
Despite the statutory language and legislative history, some courts have applied a cost-benefit analysis. See, e.g., Monette v. Electronic Data Sys. Corp., 90 F.3d 1173, 1184 n.10, 5 AD Cas. (BNA) 1326, 1335 n.10 (6th Cir. 1996); Vande Zande v. Wisconsin Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 543, 3 AD Cas. (BNA) 1636, 1638-39 (7th Cir. 1995).
122. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(2) (1994); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.6 (1997) (prohibiting an employer from participating in a contractual relationship that has the effect of subjecting qualified applicants or employees with disabilities to discrimination).
123. See 42 U.S.C. § 12203(b) (1994); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.12(b) (1997).
124. For example, under Title III of the ADA a private entity that owns a building in which goods and services are offered to the public has an obligation, subject to certain limitations, to remove architectural barriers so that people with disabilities have equal access to these goods and services. 42 U.S.C.
§ 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv) (1994). Thus, the requested modification may be something that the property owner should have done to comply with Title III.
125. US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S., 122 S. Ct. 1516, 1523 (2002).
127. See Questions 5-10 for a discussion of the interactive process.